Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

William E. Naylor et al v. Salt Lake City Corp : Brief
of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellants;
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr.; Jack L. Crellin; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Naylor v. Salt Lake City, No. 10114 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4572

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

•

,...

'1

(

-,

·~
.·'

r

~
I

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
\rILL L \~1

1~ .

N .A1~ LOR, \V JLLl1:\ nl
~ )~SI~:Y, ,JA~ll~~s L. Nl~\.lLLE, and
BL \~E. 11 \NSEN,
JJ[a,i utiff.s aHd r1p1Jcllallls,
V ti .

S.\L1' L ..\l{E CITY C 0 R, P 0 R 1\T I () N, a lllll n i ci p a I co r por at i on, J.
B H .\ C I'" 1~~ N 1~1~:1~ , 1-iERBEI~T F.
nl \ Lrr, n~QR, G 1~ B. CATJ\[lTLIJ,
()~H..AD I LA R R 1 S 0 N, JOJ£ J_j.
CllltLSTI~~Sl~N, R,A\~ ROLFSON,
and .AL1)l£R-\V1\LLACE, INC., a
l ~ tah

Cabe No.

10114

corporation,

Defcuda uts and R es poudcuts.

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF
1\ppPal Fron1 'J.1hc J udg1nent Of The
{jy,r(l-Pi strict Court for Salt Lake County
· lionorable .A.. H. Ellett, Judge
rl '

\~.i--\N

r

K ~ I

&

COTT, BAGLEY,

COR~\\~..:\LL

~[c(~ ARTHY

Suitr 300, G5 South l\Iain Street
Salt Lake City, l Ttah
(}rant ~[acfarlanP, Jr .
. .4ttorn e.y$. for . AppellaNts
i

O~C.:\R

~reCOXl{lE,
1010 Dr~P l't t B ui lrli ll 0o·

\r.

:;

JR:

'l

1

~alt

Lake

Cit~·, l~tah

J .-\.CI{ L. CRBl~LIX
A ~i~tant CitY .i-~ttorneY
i 1-t CitY and ·countY B.ni lding·
Salt La.kP CitY. , l~b~h
A.t f o r 11 e.II·" f o r If es p o n d c n t s

··-.

r
...
- '. -:. , t.. ,; ;c_;

"' . .
'J

- ..
I;

!. ·' ,. - ......
'•

L

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rr ABijE~

OF CONTENTS
Page

STATE ~I ~~NT OF THE KIND OF CASE____________

1

DISP(lR ITION IN LOWER COURT______________________

1

HE LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL____________________________

2

ST 1\ TEl\lENT OF FACTS________________________________________

2

.A Rf} U l\ IENT -----___ .............. ----_.. __ ----.----------------__ ------------

12

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCIJlTDING AS A MATTER OF LAW
FROJ\11 THE PLEADINGS AND PRETRIAL STATEMENT THAT THE CITY
HAD ACTED WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING THE ZONING ORDINANCE ··········----------------------------------------------------------

12

The Complaint States a Claim for Inva1id ity of the Ordinamce______________________________________

18

Comprehensive Plan ------------------------------------

18

Police Power - Zoning Purposes________________

26

Change of Conditions____________________________________

29

The Record Does Not Justify a Determination That the Allegations of the Compi ai1lf Are Not True__________________________________________

31

CON CLUSI ON --------------------------------------------------------------

32

CASES CITED

.A.ppley v. Township Committee, 128 N.J.L. 195,
~4 ..:\. 2d 805------------------------------------------------.-------------

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page

Clark v. Town Council of Town of West Hartford,
145 Conn. 476, 144 A.2d 327---------------------------------19
Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307,
358 p .2d 633·------------------------------------------------------------- 19, 22
Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J. Super.
276, 123 A.2d 46 ------------------------------------------------------ 20, 21
Kuehne v. Town of East Hartford, 136 Conn.
452, 72 A.2d 474-----------------------------------------------------24
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,
141 p .2d 704 ____________________________________________ 15, 18, 20, 25, 26
Northwest Merchants Terminal Inc. v.
0 'Rourke, 191 Md. 721, 60 A.2d 743....................
Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632,
165 p .2d 280.·-------------------------------------------------------··Wilcox, et al. v. City of Pittsburgh, 121 F. 2d 835,
(C. C.A. 3rd, 1941) --------------------------------------------------

30
30
30

STATUTES

~ 10-9-1, 2, U. C.A., 1953 ------------------------------------------------

14

§ 10-9-3, U. C.A., 1953·-------------------------------_____ --------------- 14, 18

TEXTS

Haar, ''In Accordance With a Comprehensive
Plan,'' 68 Harv. L. Rev., 1154, 1167 ----------------·-

19

51 A.L.R. 2d 263 ....... -----------------------------------------------------

25

101 C.J.S. 837-----------------------------------------------· ---· --------------

31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme CoUrt of the State of Utah
\VILI.JL\:\f 1•~. ~ . \1L<H~, \\'"lljljli\~1
CO~~·q•: Y, .LA ~II·~~ L. ~I~~\~ lL'L·E, and
HL .\I·~ 1•~. I L\ ~~I·~ X,
1'/aintiffs aud . tppellanf.~.,·,

vs.
~.\ LT I J4\ I' li~ CITY C 0 R J:> <) R ATI< )~, a Inunieipal corporation, J.
H H .\ C J( ~~~ ~ LEE, HERBERT F.
~'1.\BT, GE<)B<iE B. CAT~IULL,
C()~Rl\D II ..:\ RR IS 0 N, JOE L.
CIIH.l~TI~~~SI~~N, RAY ROLFSON,
and 4\ L DER- AI_.jLACl~~, INC., a
l Ttah corporation,
Defend aut,"· and Respondents.

Case No.

10114

'r

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
~T.\T~1fEXrr

OF THE KIND OF CASE

'Thi~ i~

an action for declaratory judgment and injunctivP relief challenging the validity of an ordinance
{on acted by ~a 1t Lake City Corporation.

Thr lo".,.er court granted defendants' motion for
~ummary judgment of dismissal at the pretrial conference.
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RELIEF SO·UGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs, Willia1n Cossey and Blae E. Hansen, seek
reversal of the summary judgment of dis1nissal and a
trial on the merits of the action.

STATEI\IENT OF FACTS
On the 1st day of October, 1963, the Board of Coinmissioners of Salt Lake City passed an ordinance changing the zoning classification of approxin1ately one-half of
a city block from a Residential R-6 classification to a
Business B-3 classification. This suit \Vas instituted on
October 30, 1963, for judgment declaring the ordinance
invalid and in excess of the City's po"~er and authority
and for decree enjoining and restraining the defendants
from granting building permits for the erection of improvements not authorized in a Residential R-6 zone.
Plaintiffs are taxpayers and property owners in the
area affected by the zoning ordinance. The con1plaint
alleges that on or about September 1, 1927, the defendant
City enacted a zoning ordinance and adopted a use district map in pursuance of a comprehensive plan for
zoning of Salt Lake City and that the Board of ·ComInissioners of the defendant City has appointed a qualified Planning Commission to process, study and advise
'\\:rith respect to all 1natters relating to the comprehensive
plan. It further avers, inter alia, that on or about May
28, 1963, Alder-Wallace, Inc. filed \vith the Planning
C~ommission its petition for a1nendment of the use district 1nap by changing certain premises located in a
Residential R-6 use district to a Commercial C'-3 classifi-
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cation: that in accordan<·P \v"ith the provisions of the
~tatuh· the Planning (~ommission made a careful study
ot' tht· pPtition and the ehangc therehy proposed "Tith
respr<·t to the cotnprehensive plan; that the Planning
Cntnn1ission after said study reconunended that the
applieation he denied for the reasons that: (R. 3-4)
..... th(• said pro poRed ehange "~as not consistent
"·ith, but contrary to the con1prehensive zoning
plan: that the proposed change bore no reasonable relationship to the character of the area and
di~trirt to be affected thereby: that there was no
need or reason ~ho"'"n for additional business or
eotntnercial zoning; that the proposed change
""ould constitute 'spot' zoning and that the application ",.as for other sound reasons inconsistent
\rith the general purpose and plan of the then
Pxisting zoning ordinance."
Plaintiffs' complaint next alleges the adoption of the
ordinance changing the subject pre1nises from an R-6
classification to a B-3 classification and avers that the
ordinance is invalid for the following reasons: (R 4-5)
HTX. The ordinance attempting to rezone the
said tract of land, thereby creating a small Busines~ B-3 district in a Residential R-6 district, and
all thing~ done or attempted in pursuance thereof are unla'\\'"ful and in excess of the City's power
and authority and null and void and in violation
of the express terms of Title 10, c·hapter 9, Utah
Code .A.nnotated 1953, in the following particulars:
(a) Said attempted zoning of said tract
of land in the residential district of Salt
Lake City is not in accordance, but contrary
to thP eomprehensive zoning plan authorized
by statute and adopted by the City.
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(b) Said atte1npted rPzoning of ~aid
tract of land does not tend to prou1otP Pither
the health, safety or general \\'Plfare of Salt
Lake City, nor does the same tend to lessen
congestion in the streets or to secure saf(~ty
from fire, panic or other dangers, or to promote any of the othPr purposes for which
zoning of cities is by statute permitted, but
on the contrary, such atten1pted zoning tends
to the detriment of the purposes for \vhieh
zoning is permitted.
(c) Said attempted rezoning does not

give reasonable _or any consideration to thP
character of the district or the use of lands
therein, nor does it encourage or tend to encourage the 1nost appropriate use of lands
throughout the City as specified and required
by the statutes, but on the contrary, said
attempted rezoning tends to and does promiscuously intermingle business property
with residential property, contrary to and
in disregard of the letter, purpose and spirit
of the statutes and the zoning plan authorized
and adopted for Salt Lake ·City.
{d) No notice of a proposed change of
the use district map from Residential R-6
classification to Business B-3 classification
as required by Title 10, Chapter 9, Section
5, U.C.A. 1953, 'vas given prior to the enactment of the ordinance."
The defendants filed answers ad1nitting 1nost of the
material allegations of the co1nplaint but denying the
allegations of the aforesaid Paragraph IX and praying
for dismissal of the con1plaint (R. 10, 11, 12, 13). Counsel for Alder-Wallace, Inc. thereafter filed his affidavit
'vherein he recites the enactnu~nt of the ordinanee and
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~tatP~

that "the quPHtion involved in the instant litigation i~ \rho1ly a tnatter of la\\·'' (R. 17-.19). Counsel'~
affidavit also identifies the use distriet 1nap of Salt
Lake City, \rhich is attached thereto as an exhibit. DefpnsP <·onnsel also filed the affidavit of ern on J orgen~Pn, \rhich rPcites that ~ir. Jorgensen has advised the
1nayor of Salt .I .jake City with respect to \Yhat notice has
<·nstotnarily been required preceding the enactment of
zoning ordinance~ (R. 21). With the issues thus framed,
and based upon the pleadings and the aforesaid affidavit~, thP defendants moved the Court for summary
judg1nent of dismissal ( R. 15).

'r

On Fehruary 5, 1964, defendants' motion for sum•nary judgment came on regularly for hearing before
the l-lonorable Aldon J. Anderson. The motion was
argued h~· counsel and at the conclusion of the hearing
the ~an1e \vas denied. Judge Anderson made and entered
his \Vritten order denying said motion (R. 23).
On the sa1ne day that the motion for summary judgInent 'vas denied, defense counsel filed a notice of readiness for trial. Within one day after the service of the
notice of readiness, plaintiffs' counsel filed a \vritten
objection to thP same (R. 25). Notwithstanding said
objection the cas0 \vas given a preferential pretrial
setting by the Honorable A. H. Ellett.
On March 11, 1964, the case came on for pretrial
before Judge Ellett. After a preliminary discussion the
Court directed plaintiffs' counsel to enlarge upon the
allegations of the complaint by stating further the
grolmds upon "·hich it 'vas contended that the City had
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acted arbitrarily. Plaintiffs' counseln1ade the follo\ring
statement: (R. 28-34)
l\IR.. :JIACFARLANE: 1 \rill state that
specifically the action that \Vas taken herP that
the plaintiffs dee1n to be arbitrary is alleged in
the con1plaint and particularly paragraph 9 of
the co1nplaint; and we rely, of course, no\v upon
every one of the allegations of the complaint and
will state more specificallyH

THE c·o,URT: Yes.
1IR. MACFARLANE: -at this time in
support of the allegations of the cornplaint but
not by way of limitation that the commission was
arbitrary and capricious and acted without regard to a general or co1nprehensive plan in that
in the i1nmediate vicinity, that is, bet\veen South
Temple and Ninth East Street and Second East
- I mean South Temple and Ninth South Street
and Second East and Seventh East there are 41¥2
acres of Business B-3 zoning, 27 per cent of which
is not being used for business purposes; 55¥2
acres of Commercial C-1 zoning, 39 per cent of
which or -!0 per cent of \vhich is not used for business purposes; 243.3 acres of Commercial C-3
zoning, 25 per cent or 32¥2 per cent of which is
not used for business purposes, indicating that
there is considerable land in the general area
already zoned for business or commercial use
\\"hich is not so used; and that the evidence would
further sho\v- that there are substandard and deteriorated business and connnercial buildings in
the B-3, (~-1, and C-3 areas \vhich should be replaced by new buildings; that the action of the
commission in jumping a block of property zoned
R-6 and R-7 and establishing a C-3 zone entirely
or B-3 zone entirely surrounded by commercial! mean residential property \Vas completrly \\"ith-
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out regard to any general or eotnprehensive plan
and, on thP contrary, has the nPeessary effect of
estnhlishing instability in the adjoining residential properties~ that the boundaries established
for the new zone are not only unrelated to any
cotnprehPnsive or general plan but are not logical
boundaries and are based entirely upon the appliration of Alder- allace, '"hich in turn is based
upon the availability of land and not its suitability for USP within the meaning of the zoning laws;
that criteria which have been followed and are
~ti 11 a part of the general plan of the city were
ignored in creating the new district in that it is
not contiguous to any existing commercial area
and nonetheless is ",.ithin close proximity to other
cotnmercial areas, is established on Seventh East,
'vhieh is a main artery of traffic for "'"hich the
poliry of the commission, both planning commission and city com1nission, has been and still is to
prevent access, new access and particularly businPss access on said freeway, and the further
criteria that there shall be no zone change made
except upon the sho'\\ring of need or change of
c.ondi tions in the area; that as a matter of law
the sho'\\'"ing, attempted sho,Ying made on behalf
of the application, did not show either a change
of conditions or need which would warrant the
action that was taken, there being no economic
studies or any other evidence produced before the
co1nmission: that the uses allo,ved in the B-3 district are incoinpatible '""ith the future developInent of the lands surrounding the spot 'vhich \Vas
zoned here, w·hich lands are zoned R-6.

"'r

Xo,v, in substance, Your Honor, that is our
position 'vith reference to the action that was
taken by the commission.
THE COlTRT : Let me ask you one other
thing. ''Till your proof show \Yhether or not any
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of those acreages of land zoned to B-3 "~as available for sale and not alrPady used by so1ne other
use that couldn't be readily changed~
n[R. ~I ACF ARLAKE : )'" PS, \\~P think it
will. N o,v, I personally did not participate jn the
study, and I don't kno~r "Thich of th< SP lands
\Vould be availablP and at what pricPs.
1

THE C0{1RT: Well, I in1agine your Utah
Power & Light in a "~hole block, 'vould be ten
acres of that, and I am sure nothing 'vould change
that.

niR. :JIA·CFARLANJ~:
true.

That is probably

THE CO·UR.T : I "~onder if it is true in the
rest of this acreage.
MR. MACFARLANE : I don't think so.
THE COUR.T: What is the use that he proposes to put this to~
MR. ~IcCONKIE: The proble1n is they
have to get a big area in one place.
THE COUR,T : N o,v, you have on Second
South two shopping areas east of Fifth East or
Fourth, one between Fourth and Fifth and one
b e t 'v e e n Second and Third; Albertson's and
Grand Central are on Second South further 'Yrst
half between there and to"rn, don't you~
~IR.

l\IAC·F ARLANE : I don't know.

MR. lfcCONKIE : Yes.
~lR.

CR.ELLIN:

Is it Albertson?

l\fR.. 1\{cCONI{IE : Albertson on S e c o n d
South and Fourth East and Grand Central on
Second South and Fifth East.
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'r II F~ ro l TRT :

AtH 1 do you have any-ho'v
far north do yon haYP to go fro1n ~peond South
hpfor·p you rornP to ~neb a ~imilar shopping cent(lr ~
~I R.

~leC()Xl(IE:

J n~t a 1no1nent, Your

II on or.
'ri-ll~

( 0URT: Let l\fr. Macfarlane-he is
tPlling nlP \vhat hi~ proof \\·ill sho,v. I 'vonder
\\·hat his proof 'vill sho'v about that.
1

~IR. ~Lt\.CF ARLANE:

l\Iy proof "·ill sho"·
that there is propert),. zoned for commercial and
husinP~~ use \\rithin thP area as shown b~,. the USP
di~triet 1nap \\rhich is a part of the file here.

THE C()lTRT:

Let's mark it.

~IR.. ~I . I\CFARLANE:
.
\Vhether it is actuall~· used for that I don't know, but I'm not~IR.

l\Icc·oNKIE: This is 1ny copy. We
haYP one in the file if you want to mark the one
in the file.

JIR. CREILLIN: J.\!Iight as well use this,
Judge. They are exactly the same.
THE COlTRT : I will use this one.
~rR.

CRELLIN:
it out of the file.

Except you haYe to pull

THE COl'"RT: That's all right. Can it be
agreed that pretrial Exhibit 1, \vhich I am now
marking, is a-and, by the \\ray, that is a photostatic copy attached to an affidavit signed by
,.,.ern on Jorgensen. l\[ay it be agreed that that is
a photo~tatic copy of a use 1nap of Salt Lake
City!
~IR. ~I . -\.
. CF AR.L . \XE
.

: Yes.
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MR. CRELLIN:

Yes.

THE COlTRT : Do you gentle1nen so agrPe?
::\IR. CR.ELLIN:
MR.

~IcCONKIE:

rrhat's right.
Yes.

THE c·OlTRT : Can it further hP agrePd
that the general plan of Salt Lake City is to be
ascertained from this use map together with the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City now in
force and effect, 1955 ~
~fR.

MA·CF ARLANE : No.

~fR.

CRELLIN:

That is our position.

MR. l\fcCONKIE: Yes, but if that is the
case, you are bound to giveTHE c·o·URT : Wait a minute What then,
~Ir. ~facfarlane, do you claim the-where will I
look for the general plan if I don't look to the
ordinances~

MR. MACFARLANE : I think you may
only look for the general plan in the tflstimony of
planning com1nission members and eity commission members, not only in the past for " . hat the
plan has been, but in the present for 'vhat, of
course, they may-,vhat the present plan is.
THE COURT : As forMR. M.ACF ARLANE : ~ly position is that
the use district map is simply evidence or the
effect, presumably the effect, of some plan which
concededly 1nay be amended from time to time;
but 'vhenever any ordinance is enacted amending
or ehanging the use district map, it must be in
accordance with some general over-all or comprehensive plan or purpose affecting an area beyond
that imn1ediately affected hy the application.
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rrHE

(~()l~Rrr:

\Y'ouldn't you agrer that thP
ordinaneP~ of Salt Lake Citv would be some rvidPnre of what the plan "~~s, "·hat the general
plnn iH Y
:\I R. ~L:\C'F ARLANE: ,,. . ell, e e r t a in 1 y
thafs solllP PvidPnce of 'vhat the eity has done in
1ntrsnaneP of the plan, that is correct.

rrilE CO·lTRT: All right: but then you also
<·lnirn that the general plan lies \\"ithin the me1nory
und kno\\·ledge of certain people, is not \YTitten
down any,vhere7
~fR.

~IACF,ARLANE:

"\Veil, that is correet. I don't think that you can look at the use
district n1ap and say, 'Here is the plan. Now,
"·herP do \\~P go from here~' I think that there
has to be so1nething independent of the use distrirt tnap and the ordinance in order to guide the
connnission in its actions in amending the plan,
and thP statute itself says that there must be a
general or co1nprehensive plan, and I deem that
to he something in addition to the ordinance and
the use district map.
~IR.

CREIJLIN: Then every ordinance that
Salt Lake City has ever passed 'vould be in jeopardy under that theory, Your Honor, because
Pvery ordinance that's ever been passed since the
antiquity could be challenged on the basis that we
then go to the memory of people at that time as to
\Yhat the basis of plan was."
During the course of the pretrial plaintiffs moved
thP court to a1nend the complaint by adding to Paragraph IX an additional allegation "that the ordinance is
invalid and of no force and effect for the reason that
the applicant, Alder- allace, Inc., as a mere optionee
having no legal or equitable interest in the real estate

''r
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did not have standing to invoke the zoning po,,·pr of thr
city" (R-. 34). Though defense counsel1nade no objection
to the timeliness of this Inotion, the 1notion \vas deniPd
by Judge Ellett upon the ground that as a InattPr of la\v
an optionee does have sufficient standing to invoke thP
zoning ordinance (R. 38).
·The court thereupon directed the dis1nissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and subsequently entered
judgment of dismissal (R. 27, 38). This appeal follo\\·Pd.

ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A
MATTER OF LAW FROM THE PLEADINGS AND PRETRIAL STATEMENT THAT THE CITY HAD ACTED WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING THE ZONING ORDINANCE.

If, under the pleadings and pretrial statement, there
is any material issue of fact, or any material issue of
la\v which cannot properly be resolved 'vithout factual
background not before the Court, then the dis1nissal
must be set aside and the cause remanded for trial. The
substance of the allegations attacking the zoning action
are that: (R. 5-6, 28-30)

1. The zoning action is 1zot in accordance
·zcith a co1nprehe'11sive plan. Change of the use
classification fro1n residential to business is not
based upon any general or co1nprehensive plan
related to benefit of the district, area or comJnunitv as a 'vhole but instead is based solely
upon ~onsiderations pertinent to the property rezoned and the o'vners of such property.
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:2. The zonin.f/ action is not in furtherance of
thP potict· JUHl'l'r. The ordinance is not designed

to and cloPs not areo1nplish any of the objectives
of the polic'P po\ver ( i.P. health, safety~ general
\\'PlfarP. ~treet congestion, security from fire,
pnnie, ete.).
:1. The zoning action is contrary to the stated
JHtrpo.'·W of the zoning lau·."·· The ordinance gives

no consideration to other properties in the residential di~trict "'hPre the change has been made
nnd doPs not encourage appropriate use and
orderl~· developn1ent of land in the district, area
or eonununity~ bnt on the contrary arbitrarily
intPrininglPs husinPss property 'vith residential
JlrOpPrt~· to the detriment of other property
o'vners and the community as a whole.
-1-. The atnendn1ent of the existing zoning
nlaJJ is not supported by a shouJing of changed

couditio11s. The zoning act changes or an1ends
thP existing plan (presumably fair, rational and
ron1prehensive) in the absence of any sho,ving of
change of conditions or change of circumstances
\Yhich 'vould warrant interruption of the stability
of said pIan.
In reyie,ving a su1nn1ary judg1nent of disn1issal an
t'~tahlished principle of appellate review is that the review·ing court 'vill accept as true the allegations of the
plaintiffs' complaint and pretrial statement even though
the ~arne are in n1aterial respects denied by the defendants. 1:-nless there is a stipulation or admission or son1e
uncontroverted evidence 'vhich would justify the trial
judge in concluding as a n1atter of la'v that the allegations attacking the ordinance are not true, then said
allegations n1ust be accepted as fact for the purpose of
thi~ appeal. In determining the merit of appellants'
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argument this Court 1nust resolve the follo\\?ing quP~
tions:
A. Are the allegations attacking the ordinance
sufficient in la\v to state a claim of invalidity
and, if so,
'
B.

Doe~

the record belo\v justify a judicial deterJuination as a matter of law that the allegations attacking the ordinance are not true f

Proper resolution of these issues requires a revie'v of
the law applicable to the case at bar.
Salt Lake City is e1npo,vered by statute to '~regulate
and restrict ... the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other
purposes" and for that purpose to "'divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as
may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of
[the statute]" (10-9-1, 2, U.·C.A., 1953). The power of
the City to enact zoning ordinances in accordance with
the intent and purpose of the statute and within the limitations of the statute is not questioned in this case.
The City, however, does not have the unlilnited, undefined and unrestricted power to legislate the use of
property. Statutory limitations are specifically imposed
by Section 10-9-3, U.C.A., 1953:
"10-9-3. Reg,ulations to be in accordance with
coJnprehensi~·e

plan.-81f.Ch regulat-i.ons shall be
1nade in accorda,nce with a co1nprehensive plan
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to
secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers,
to promote health and the general \\'"elfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overrro\vding of land, to avoid undue concentration
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of population, to facilitate adequatP provision for
tran:-;portation. \\·ater, se\\·age, schools, parks and
othPr public requirements. Such regulations shall
bt, nuule 1rit h reasonable consideration, among
olht'r thin,qs, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a. ni('U' to conserving the value of btttildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throu.,rJhout the city." (Emphasis added)

ThP dPeision of this (~ourt in Marshall v. Salt Lake City,
105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, fixes son1e guidelines and
~tnndards hy \Yhieh the validity of municipal zoning
nrtion is to be determined.
Plaintiff in the Marshall case attacked an ordinance
tunending the zoning map on the ground that Salt Lake
City did not have the authority as a part of a general
zoning plan to create small general utility zones 'vithin
rP~idPntial districts. The case was tried to the District
Court of Salt Lake County. Upon trial of the cause,
including extensive evidence pertaining to the character
of the areas involved, land uses, existing zoning and
background of the zoning ordinance as it affected the
area in question, the trial court concluded that the
a1nendment to the map was unreasonable, unlawful, discriininatory and void. On appeal the decision of the trial
court 'vas reversed upon specific determination from the
eridencc in the cause that the amendment of the map 'vas
in accordance ""ith a general zoning plan to set within
reasonable ""alking distance of homes in the residential
areas, daily fa1nily conveniences such as groceries, gasoline, etc. In this regard, the Supreme Court concluded
fro1n the evidence that there was "a definite and com-
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prehensive plan" and that the zoning action hen' \Vas a
part of such plan and was therefore valid. ThP purpose
and limitations of the zoning authority \Vere PxprPssed
as follows: (105 Utah 111, 119-125)
~'.

. . As ~ho,vn hy· th<:l above quotes fron1 thP
statute, the city i~ authorized to regulate and
rPstrict ~the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence and
other purposes' and to accomplish this 'may divide the municipality into Districts of such number, shape and area as n1ay be deemed best suited
to carry out the purposes of this Article.' (Italics
ours) This is done under the police power and
by the statute must be done in accordance \Vith a
co1nprehensive plan, designed, inter alia, to lessen
congestion in the street, promote the general \velfare, facilitate transportation, and other public
requirements. It shall be done with reasonable
consideration of the character of the district,
its suitability for particular uses 'and with a
view to conserving * * * and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land.' Sec. 15-8-91, supra.
That the statute contemplates a division and
regulation by districts, instead of regulation by
single lots or small groups of lots, is evident.
The regulation of the use of property by lots or
by very small areas is not zoning and does violence to the purpose and provisions of the statute.
It would not, and could not, accomplish the purpose of the la\v as set forth in th~ statute quoted
supra. . . .

* * *
'~City

zoning is authorized only as an exerei se of the police po,ver of the state. It must
therefore have for its purposes and objectives
1natters \Vhich come \Yithin the province of the
police po"Ter. \Y.hen exercised by a rity. it is of
necessity confined by the limitations fixerl in the
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.~rant h~·

thP statP, and to accotnplishtnent of the
}Hll'fH>SPs for 'vhirh thP ~tatP authorized the city
to ZOnP. rrho~P ]Hll'J10~P~, \Vhieh COntrol and must
hP !-'Uh~PrvPd h~· any zoning, ar{l set forth in Section 15-8-91, lJ. ( ~ ....\. 19-1-3, quoted supra. The {l letnPnt~ required of a zoning plan are: It u1ust be
comprehensiv(}; it must he dPsigned to protect
the health, Hafet~·, and n1orals of the inhabitants;
to protnote the gen{lral "·plfare; avoid overcrowding and eongestion in traffic and population ;
facilitatP transportation and other public servieP: and 1neet the ordinary or com1non require1HPnts of happy convenient and comfortable living
h~,. the inhabitants of the districts, and the city as
a 'vhole....
* * *
"The basic purpose of zoning is to 'bring
about an orderly development of cities, to establish districts into which business, commerce, and
industry shall not intrude, and to fix certain territory for different grades of industrial concerns.
• • • The exercise [of this power] must have a
substantial relation to the public good within the
~pheres held proper.' White's Appeal, 287 p·a.
~59, 134 A. 409, 412, 53 A.L.R. 1215. 'It is a
fundamental theory of the zoning scheme that it
~hall be for the general good, to secure reasonable
neighborhood uniformity, and to exclude structures and occupations which clash there,vith.' ...

* * *
HZoning is done for the benefit of the city as
a ",.hole, and the lin1itations imposed on respective
tli~tricts n1ust be done 'vith a vie'v to the benefit
of the district as a "'"hole, and not from consideration of particular tracts ....
* * *
~The tests of validity in such cases are :
Does the ordinance bear a reasonable relation to
the public health, 1norals, safety or general welH
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fare; have the districts been created according
to a fair and rational plan~'"
We now turn to a discussion of the 1nerits of plaintiffs' argument in light of the principles laid dow·n in tl1P
Marshall case.
THE CO,MPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR
INVALIDITY OF T·HE OR.DINANCE

As heretofore noted, the coinplaint charges that the
zoning action is not in accordance "~ith a "con1prehensive
plan"; not supported by a sho,Ying of changed circunlstances; not in furtherance of the police po\ver, and contrary to the purpose and spirit of the zoning la\vs. Any
one of these allegations, if supported by evidence at the
trial of the cause, \Vould justify the relief sought.
Comprehensive Plan
Statutory enabling legislation requires that municipal zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
(10-9-3, 11 .C.A., 1953). In this respect, the Utah statutes
are similar to legislation adopted by legislatures of over
40 other states. The decision in the Marshall case, In
referring to zoning action, states:

HThis [zoning by di~trict~] is done under thP
police po\ver and by the statute Hl'lfst be done in
accordance 1.rith a co1nprehensiz e plan ...
* * *
" ... The Pleinents required of a zoning plan
are : It must be comprehensive; . . . (Emphasis
added)
1

There is son1e confusion in the cases as to the mean1ng of the tern1 "comprehensivP plan." AuthoritiPs
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.~Pn(lrally agrPP

that the ter1ns ''Ina~ter plan'' and ~'coin
pn·hPn~ivP plan'' nre not synonytnous. The former is
dPfin•·d hy onP authority on thP subject as "a long-ter1n
.~PnPrnl plan for the ph~·si(lal develop1nent of the comrnunity \vhieh en1bodies inforn1ation, judgments and ob.i•·etivP~ collected and forn1ulated by experts to serve as
hoth a guide and predictive force" ( Haar, "In Accordnnre 'Vith .A. Comprehensive Plan," infra). Existence of
a 1nn~tPr plan is not essential to the validity of zoning
tneasures (SPe, e.g., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11
tTtah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633).
The ~'comprehensive plan," "·hich is essential to the
validity of any zoning 1neasure, has been defined as "a
general plan to control and direct the use and developInPnt of property in a municipality or a large part thereof hy dividing it into districts according to the present
and potential uses of the property." Clark v. Town
Council of Tou·n of West Hartford, 145 ·Conn. -176, 144
..\.:!d 327. Confusion in the cases as to what the standard
"cotnprehensive plan'' means is pointed out in an article
on the subject written by Charles ~f. Haar, Assistant
Professor of La,v, Harvard Law School: ("In Accordance 'Yith A Co1nprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. L. Rev.,
1154, 1167)
.:\n ele1nent apparently co1nmon to all the
(lases dealing \Yith this problem is consideration
of \\·hether the zoning action under attack conforins to so1ne sort of general plan-that is,
w·hether it may be defended as logically related
to ~omething broader than and beyond itself. This
general plan, or comprehensive plan, 'vith which
the runendinent must conforn1, is many things to
Inany courts. It 1nay be the basic zoning ordinance
H
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itself, or the generalized 'polir~v' of the locallegi~
lative or planning authoriti~s in rP~pPet to their
cit~~'s development-or it 1nay be nothing 1nore
than a general feeling of fairness and rationalitY.
Its identity is not fi:rrrl 1rith any precision, aJ;d
n.o one can point 1rith confidence to rn1y particular
set of factors, or any docun1e;d, and ,~.,·ay that there
is tlu~ general plan to u·hich the zoni·nlJ enablinq
act de;nnnds fidelity." (En1phasis added)
A requirement common to all of the ca~P~ i~ that
the zoning ordinance n1ust be con1prehensive in that it
is n1otivated by '"benefit of the district as a \\Thole and
not a consideration of particular tracts" and may be
logically related to something broader than the property
itself. (SPe ll!arshall r. Salt Lake City~ supra.)

All of the authorities recognize that a change or
an1endment of an existing zoning plan n1ust be 1nade in
conformity to the enabling statute to the san1e extent a~
an original zoning ordinance. The "co1nprehen~ive"
standard is thus applicable to changes and a1nendn1ents
of the 1nap. In analyzing this standard as it relates to
rnnendments, the Court should initially deter1nine "1'hether "co1nprehensive plan', is synony1nous ·w·ith the
zoning map and ordinance or 'vhether it requires consideration of matters extrinsic to the ordinance itself.
In this regard, the case of Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J.Super. 276, 123 A.2d ~6, is of assistanrP.
Plaintiffs in the H ochbrrg case sought to set aside an
amendment to the zoning ordinancP. In applying the
"co1nprehensive" standard, the court said: (123 A.2d
4-6, 51)
HBut \\~hat does the ter1n "con1preh~nsiv<' plan'
~ignify f It hardly SPPnls to haYP r~ference jn~t to
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tht· plan PtuhorliPd in thP zoning ordinanrP it~Plf~
hP('H\l~P thPn the zoning ~ehPillP \Vould hP frozen
and hPyond a1nend1nent. ThP zoning la'v looks
to\vard a stable [citing authorities] but not a
static or unchangeable community [citing authoritiPsl.
··The tPrin 'rontprPhensive plan' therefore
~ignifips so1nething other than the prP-Pxisting
zone plan. ~r oreover, it has significance, even
though, as in thP case of the Borough of Freehold, thPrP is no formal master plan....
.. Ho1ne slight clue to the significance of the
tPrin is perhaps to be found in the following
explanatory note to Section 3 of the Standard
~tatP Zoning Enabling Act (rPcon1mended by
lT. S. Dept. of Com., Hoover, Secy. of Com.,
1926) fro1n "Thich N ..J.S.A. 40:55-32 'vas largely
taken:
~Thi~ \Yill prevent haphazard or pieceIueal zoning. No zoning should be done ",.ithout such a co1nprehensive study.'
~' _.:\_ co1nprehensive plan, like the process
kno\vn as municipal planning, should take account
of the variant interests affecting the physical
layout of the con11nunity, accon1n1odating them to
the interest of the connnunity as a social unit
[citing authorities].
"So far as the present case goes, we may say
then that a comprehensive plan involves at least
this-a comprehensive outlook on the community
"·elfare as a \Yhole, both a.t present and in the
foreseeable future [citing authorities]. Other factor~ 1nay be covered by the term, which require
consideration under other circumstances, but they
need not be dealt 'vith here .... "
. .\s pointed out in the Hochberg case, if the existing
ordinance is the ·~coinprehensive plan" referred to in the
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statute, then any change of thi~ ordinance is ·i p::;o facto
contrary to and not in accordance \\·ith the plan. Such
an interpretation would. render the plan beyond amendnlent.
A competent planner cannot rationall~· d( tPrinine by
looking alone to a paper plan that the next a1nend1nrnt
for the overall good should be eith~r in this dirPc-tion or
that direction. ~Iany matters extrinsic to thP 1nap Blust
be considered. The {Ttah Supren1e Court in Gnyland r.
Salt Lake Co1tnty, 11 1~tah 2d 307, 358 P.~d G33, rPcognized the necessity of considering Inatters extrinsic to
the map or ordinance in enacting zoning legislation.
Referring to the duty of the zoning authority~ this Court
said: (11 lTtah 2d 307, 310, 311)
1

Hit has the rP~pon~ibilit~· of advising itself
of an pertinent fac-ts as a basis for determining
'vhat is in the public interest in that regard."
"·hich must includt such facts "bearing on the question
of proper zoning" as :
1

'•. . . location of busine~se~, school~, roads and
traffic conditions, gro,:r-th in population and housing the capacity of utilities, the existing classifif'aton of surrounding propPrty, and the effect that
the proposed reclassification 1nay have on these
things and upon the genPral orderly develop1nent
of the county."
This Court further said:
""In pPrforininp; their dut~· it is both their
privilege and obligation to take into consideration
their o'vn kno"'"ledge of such 1natters and also to
gather available pertinent infor1nation fron1 all
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possible sourees and give consideration to it in
making their determination.'' (Emphasis added)
.Any fair, logical and rational an1endment to an
Pxi~ting plan must take into account such rnatters extrin~ie to the ordinance itself as existing land uses, nature,
condition and value of existing buildings, traffic conditions, property values, land vacancies, trends in land
devPlopinent, population changes, public need, established policies en1ployed in sin1ilar applications, and
ntunerous other considerations. None of these factors is
disclosed by inspection or study of the zoning map. An
ntnendinent of the ordinance which does not take into
account these factors extrinsic of the ordinance and map
certainly cannot fulfill the objective of "community 'velfare as a whole both at present and in the foreseeable
future'' as required and contemplated by the "comprehensive" standard.
The City Commission 1n this case heard and presumably considered evidence extrinsic of the ordinance
and map. Plaintiffs contend that the action of the Comtnission in amending the ordinance 'vas not in accordance
\vith, but contrary to the "comprehensive" standard, and
8pecifically that the zoning action was based solely upon
considerations pertinent to the property rezoned and the
O\\"ners of such property. The trial court in this cause
has determined as a matter of law, 'vithout benefit of
Pvidence as to any of the extrinsic factors bearing upon
proper planning and zoning, that the zoning action was
reasonable. Plaintiffs contend that this determination is
clearly erroneous.
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K,uehue ,z·. To1rn of East Hartford, 136 Conn. 45~, 7~

A.2d 47 4, illustrates judicial application of thP Hcoinprehensive '' standard. The facts are sin1ilar to tho~P involved in the case at bar. ThP zoning authorit~~ of thP
To\vn of East Hartford rezoned property in a residential
zone for business use. 'The applicant intended to ereet
facilities for six or eight stores in the nature of retail
stores and small business establishments calculated to
serve the needs of residents in the vicinity. A s1nall area
already zoned for business \vas located relatively close.
Fifty-one of the residents of the area filed their petition
in support of the change. An appeal from the zoning
action was taken to the Connecticut trial court. Extensive evidence was taken and the action of the zoning
authority \vas affirmed. On appeal the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding : ( 72 A.2d 474, 478, 479)
'"A lin1itation upon th<· po\vers of zoning
authorities ... i~ that the regulation~ they adopt
n1ust be made 'in accordancP \vith a con1prehenSl\ e p I an. ' . ..
•

T

"'In the case beforP us it is obvious that the
couneil looked no further than the benefit \vhich
n1ight accrue to Langloi~ and those \Yho resided
in the vicinity of his property, and that they gavP
no consideration to the larg<·r question as to the
effect the change \vould havP upon the general
plan of zoning in the connnunity. ''

*

*

*

"The action of the to\vn <·ouncil in this ca~e
\\Ta~ not in furthPrance of any general plan of
zoning in the connnunity and cannot be ~n~
tained.''
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also .Appley 1'. 1'olrnship Conuu,ittce, 12S X.J.l.J. 195,
:!4 .\.2d SO:->, and cases eollPetPd at 51 A.L.R.2d :2():3. It
i~ ~ignificant that the dPtertnination tnade in these cases
and in the ill a rshalf ca~P \Vas predicated upon evidence
of ull undPrlying eircutnstances \Vhich is in sharp contra~t to the stun1nary rPviP\V of the map 1nade by the trial
eourt in this cause.
HPP

Hhould this Court conclude that the ter1n "con1prehl1n~ive plan," \Vhen applied as a test of the validity of a
zoning atnendtnent, is in fact synony1nous with the existing zoning ordinance and that the word "comprehensive"
doP~ not contetnplate consideration of factors other than
the tnap itself, then plaintiffs earnestly contend that the
zoning action here was patently inconsistent \vith the
plan (map). The change is in direct violation of the
"ba~ie purpose" of zoning as stated in the Marshall case
in that it arbitrarily creates a business district in the
heart of a long established residential area. Assuming
need for additional business properties (which need \vas
not sho,vn in this case) then logic and reason suggest
Pnlargement or extension of existing business or con1Inerrial areas. From the plan itself it can be seen that
there is no rational basis for jumping into the center of
a re~idential area when business districts which could
have been enlarged or extended are located in the san1e
general area. Such action is in direct conflict 'vith the
"reasonable neighborhood uniformity" and "orderly development" contemplated by this Court in the JJl arshall
ease. The boundaries of the ne"r business district are
like\Yise indefensible. Such boundaries are based solely
upon the availability of land and not on any rational
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basis of harn1onious, reasonable and appropriatP land
use on a general sche1ne.
It appears that the trial court in this cause Pither
concluded that a zoning change need not compl~· "·ith thP
"con1prehensive" standard or he looked at the zoning
1nap 'vithout benefit of extrinsic evidence and concluded
as a Inatter of la"r that the City had con1plied "·ith thi~
standard. Either conclusion is reversihlP PlTor.
Police Power- Zoning Purposes

Cities do not have authority to li1nit or restriet the
use of private property Pxeept in furtheraneP of the
police power. The Ma,rshall decision recognizes that zoning is "done under the poliee pow·er" and '~Inust have for
its purposes and objeetives matters "·hieh rorne \\·ithin
the province of the poliee power." The statute enumerates those purposes for 'vhich zoning is intended (i.e. to
lessen congestion in the streets, prevent overero\\·ding of
land, avoid undue concPntration of population, etc.).
This Court in the Marshall case concludes that the "basic
purpose" of zoning is to :
". . . 'bring about an orderly develop1nent of
cities, to establish districts into 1rhich b·usiness,
con1n1r1~re and indu.'·dry shall not intrude, and to
fix certain territory for different grades of industrial concerns .... It i~ a funda1nental theory
of the zoning sche1ne that it shall be for the
general good, to secure reasonable neighborhood
uniforn1ity, and to ~xclude structure~ and oceupationf' "·hich clash thPre\\·ith.' ... " (En1phasis
added)
'\Tith established business districts in the near vicinity,
intrusion of a small new business district into the heart
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of a long-t.'}~tabli~hPd re~idential area is at once ~u~pect
of ~pPrinl intPreHt legi~lation and lack of planning.
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance involved 1n
thi~ netion was not passed to acco1nplish any of the purpo~es enutnerated in thP enabling statute and is not a
IP~ititnate exPrrise of the police po,vt~r. The complaint
rharges that the ordinance gives no consideration to the
purposes and objects of zoning legislation. This allegation is one 'vhich may be tested only by evidence.
Zoning action based solely upon considerations pertinent to one tract of land or one group of individuals
cannot be •'designed" in furtherance of the public welfare. For example, rezoning of a part of a residential area so that commercial interests will erect
ne'v buildings may serve an immediate problem in the
tract rezoned. But, what happens to the rest of the residential district surrounding the ne,vly created commercial zone'
Due consideration to the effect of the zoning action
here "'"ould have disclosed that the action taken will
create instability in the surrounding residential zone
'vhich 'viii deter and possibly prevent redevelopment of
the debilitated area for residential use. Thus, 'vhile an
aesthetic and delinquency problem for a few may have
been aided, a greater slum and delinquency problem is
created for many. (Evidence in this cause would show,
among other things, that the general plan of Salt Lake
City has been to restrict the east line of the general
business area to 5th East Street except for small neighborhood business areas provided by the original ordi-
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nancl~

of 1927. In son1e instancPs thP boundaries .of tlH'
outlying business districts have been rPadjusted. The
ne'v business zone on 7th East Street creates a high dPgree of uncertainty as to the probable future classification and use of the residential property no"~ located
hPt\\~ePn the ne'v zone and the con1n1Prcial properties to
the \\Test.)
1

Plaintiffs' evidence \\~ould show· that Salt Lake ( it~·
alrPady has too n1uch husiness and eorninPreial zoning
by all standards. Busin('~~ intPrests in land usP arP not
ah\Tays parallel and consistent 'Yith the publie intPrest
in proper com1nunity planning, ho"rever. In this ens(• thP
business interests 'Yhich the defendant Alder- \\T allaeP
rPprPsents desired a largP tract of land for coHnnPreial
use at the lowest possible eost. It is obviously n1uch less
expensive to acquire such a. tract in a residential area
than it is to obtain propert~T in an area already zoned
for commercial use. The next step is to ask City authorities to rezone the residence property which has been
optioned so that it can la,vfully be used for cornmercial
purposes. Such a proposal naturally has the support
of many property o'vners "Those profitable sale of their
property is contingent upon t1H rezoning. Like"~ise,
such a proposal is highly offensive to the conscience
of the City planning staff. (The report of the Planning
Con1mission in this case demonstrated intensive study
o.f the application and careful thinking on its n1erit
fro1n a planning standpoint.) It is not difficult to establish a case for the proposition that business zoning 'Yill
benefit these property o'vners and the Yaluation of the
1
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prop~rty

thPy SPPk to ~ell. Huch a ~ase is, nPVPrthPIP~~,
n poor (and in fact an unla,vful) basis for zoning action.

The zoning a<·tion taken hy the Co1n1nission in this
<'fl~tl not only fails to consider public \Velfare in tPrins
of zoning legislation, but is antagonistic \vith public
good in these areas. The trial court's review of the
zoning map did not give fair judicial consideration to
thP problen1s of public welfare 'vhich are presented by
thP enactment of this ordinance. Evidence would establi~h the plaintiffs' position that the action here was
not designed to fulfill any public purpose. Plaintiffs
~hould be permitted to prove that the amendment to the
1nap ,,·as in this case at the instance of private persons
and for their benefit and not in the public interest.

Change of Conditions
In the case at bar, Salt Lake ·City, after due study
and public hearing, adopted a co1nprehensive and general zoning ordinance in 1927. The subject premises
and lands surrounding them have been zoned for residential use since original enactment of the ordinance.
History of zoning in the municipality will show that
thPre have been no significant changes in commercial
zoning except in ter1ns of readjustment of the boundaries of existing con1n1ercial districts. The action here
taken does not fall \vithin the category of readjustment
of boundaries, for it is not contiguous ''"'ith any existing
eon1n1ercial district. Instead, it constitutes the creation
of an entirely new coinmercial district. It is a substantial departure fro1n the existing 1nap or plan.
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Prestunably the plan existing at thP tiu1e of the
amendment, \vhich plan classified the propPrty as residential, \vas a fair, rational and conlprE?h(Jn~iv<· plan.
Such a presumption was given recognition by the court
in Northwest lVlerchants Termina.l Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191
l\f d. 721, 60 A.2d 743, \vhere the court said:
"There is a presumption that zonPs arP "T<'ll
planned and arranged and are to lH~ n1ore or
less permanent subJect to change only to meet
genuine chan,ge in conditions." (Emphasis added)
In Page v. City of Portl(Jfflrd, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d
280, the Oregon Supre1ne Court, in striking do\vn an
amendatory ordinance, said:
"Police power 1nust be exercised to proinotP
the general \Velfare of the people at large, and
not for the interests of any private group [citing
authorities]. Amendments to zoning ordinances
should be made with caution and only when
changing conditions clearly require amendment.
Otherwise, the very purpose of zoning will be
destroyed.'' (Emphasis added)
To the same effect is W1~lco1', et al. /c. City of p,£ttsbtttrgh,
121 F.2d 835 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941), ",.here the trial court
had dismissed on motion a complaint attacking an
amendatory ordinance. The dismissal order \vas reversed
by the circuit court in an opinion \vhich read in part
as follo\vs:
''In th<· juristie ~ensP \\"';' think the council
haYP been fully put upon their proof. The general
principle is concedPd. ChangP~ in the plan, likP
tlH· enact1nent of the original ordinancP, arP an
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of polirP po\ver ......4s conditions are
th(' ha.,·is a ud j u sf if ica fin u for .zoning, clearly a
change in the {orn1er is essential to a chau,qe in
the latter." (Emphasis added)

ThP general rule rPquiring ~'change of conditions" as a
ba8is for atnendtnent of a zoning ordinance is stated in
101 C.J.S. 837 and the cases are eollected in footnotes
in the ~ntne voluniP and in the pocket parts.
The plaintiff ha.s alleged and proposes to prove tha.t
thPrP has been no change of conditions or change of
eirctunstances since the enactment of the original ordinance which warrants or justifies the amendment to the
plan. The trial court has brushed aside this allegation
hy hi~ su1n1nary dismissal order. We do not believe that
opposing rounsel can find any legal basis for the action
of the trial judge in this regard.

THE RECORD DOES NO'T JU8TIFY A DETERMINATION
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
ARE NOT TRUE

The allegations of the plaintiffs' con1plaint and the
denials of the defendants' answers set the case at issue.
The affidavit of Vernon Jorgensen does not relate in
any ,,·ay to the factual background or merits of the zoning action (R. 21). The affidavit of Oscar W. ~IcConkie,
Jr. is a 1nemorandum "~hich simply sets forth the defendants' summary of plaintiffs' allegations; states that
said allegations give rise to la'v questions only, and
further states that ~'the l"Ttah Supreme Court has settled
the la\v in these questioned particulars" (R. 17-19).
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rrhere is no factual 1nattPr in 1\Ir. 1\IcConkie'~ affidavit
\Vhich 'vould permit the trial court to eonc.lude as a
mattPr of la\Y that the plaintiffs' allPgation~ ar(• not
true. Likewise, there is nothing in thP state1nent of
plaintiff's counsel made at the time of pretrial which
"""ould \\~arrant such a conclusion (R. 28-39).
In our revie\\~ of tlu} cases \Ye have found no state
or federal decision 'vhich disposes of issue~ such as an~
raised here \Yi thout the taking of evidence. Cases tried
in this and other jurisdictions have been d(~eided onl~?
after introduction of vvidence pertaining to the factual
background and basis of the zoning action.

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the co1nplaint
and prPtrial state1nent state a claim upon \\·hich reli(·f
can b(~ granted and that there is no basis in the record
for a determination as a 1natter of la\Y that the allegations are not true. For this reason it is earne~tly eontended that the cause should be reversed and re1nanded
for trial.
Re~1)( ·ctfully ~~n h1nitted,

\-.._.AX COT1\ B . \GLE"\"'"~ CORX\'T ALL
&

~fcCARTHY

Grant

~facfarlan .. ,

Jr.

Attorneys for Appellants
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